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Abstract: The present paper explores the role of religious and social norms on a community’s 
access to public infrastructure. Distinguishing between social and physical infrastructure, we 
argue that investment in social infrastructural goods (e.g., health, education) could contribute to 
exchange both within and outside the community, while that in physical infrastructure (e.g., road, 
transport, communications) could only improve exchange outside the community. Accordingly, 
traditional communities may prefer to invest in social infrastructure goods at the cost of physical 
infrastructure goods in an attempt to preserve their indigenous identity. Using three rounds of 
Indonesian family life survey data, we find some support to this central hypothesis, even after 
controlling for all other possible covariates.   
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Norms, Culture and Local Infrastructure:  
Evidence from Indonesia  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years there has been a renewed interest to analyse whether the varied economic 
paths of different societies over time can be traced to differences in culture, customs, 
social norms and religion (e.g., see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006). The present 
paper integrates this literature with the standard literature on public goods to explore the 
role of religious and social norms, if any, on the provision of local public infrastructure in 
Indonesia.  
While there has been a growing political economy literature on the provision of 
local public goods in many developing and transition countries, the role of culture in this 
respect remains virtually unexplored. The recent development experience from around 
the world has however highlighted the role of diverse social customs/beliefs/norms on 
economic development (e.g., see Platteau 2000). We argue that the inclusion of culture is 
particularly relevant for the provision of local public goods and infrastructure, where 
community preferences and community actions feature prominently.  
Standard models of collective action argue that the provision of public goods 
depends on group size and group effort subject to free-riding on others’ efforts. Ethnic 
diversity may also affect provision of public goods; the relationship could be attributed to 
taste differences of different sections of the population (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 
1999), unequal distribution of the benefits from public goods (Khwaja, 2000) and/or 2 
 
 
inability to impose social sanctions in ethnically diverse communities (e.g., Miguel and 
Gugerty, 2005), thus leading to failures in collective actions. 
Others have highlighted the importance of various political economy 
considerations on the provision of local public goods in many decentralised economies. 
While decentralisation may increase the accountability of elected representatives and 
strengthen the voice of the poor and the marginalised, it may also enhance the influence 
of local elite (Bardhan and Mukherjee, 2000). Second, some studies have emphasized the 
role of legislator identity including reservation of seats for female (Duflo and 
Chattopadhyay, 2002) or low castes (Pande 2003) in India.  
Our analysis highlights the role of social and religious norms in the provision of 
public infrastructure in Indonesia. Some social norms could provide an effective solution 
to the problem of social organisation while others could be harmful. For example, Grief 
(1994) highlights the merits of individualist cultural beliefs for the formation of efficient 
agency relations in the context of medieval merchants. Putnam (1993) attributes the 
greater success of modern political institutions in northern Italy to the pre-existence of a 
strong civic culture. Bowles and Gintis (2004) argue how the ethnically linked parochial 
groups could achieve high levels of cooperation in informal contracts while engaging in 
exclusionary practices. Aspects of religion too can complement/motivate development 
while it can also obstruct/undermine it in most complex ways. Religious people and 
institutions may be agents of advocacy, funding innovation, empowerment, social 
movement and service delivery. Equally, religious people and institutions can incite 
violence, model hierarchy, oppose empowerment, deflect advocacy, absorb funding and 
cast aspersions on service delivery. People may find it easier to trust those who have faith 3 
 
 
in the same norms (religious/social). Religious and social norms could thus affect trust, 
which in turn may affect the optimal investment in social capital and also a community’s 
choice of local public goods. 
Indonesia is an important case in point. Indonesians are grappling with the 
problems of living in a world of differing ideas of norms and justice. On the one hand, 
there are longstanding efforts to shape lives in an Islamic way; on the other hand, there 
are even longer standing and diverse efforts to share them according to complex local 
norms and tradition called adat. All these efforts are further complicated by the nation’s 
attempt to impose modern state laws and decrees in the post-independent period with a 
view to remove local injustice.  
There are about 500 communities speaking more than 600 languages in Indonesia. 
Its pluralistic identity gives rise to a coexistence of traditional Adat laws, Islamic Sharia 
laws and positive laws of the modern state. Literally ‘adat community’ translates to 
‘autonomous’ groups of indigenous people who are able to manage their lives without 
knowing western laws and established their own regulations and social control. There has 
also been a historical division between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ Islamic values/practices 
in Indonesia; this distinguishes ‘Muslim modernists’, who seek to reform Indonesia, from 
the traditional ones. While the traditional Islamic practices lean on Sharia laws, Muslim 
modernists have focused more on the positive laws of the state. Suharto’s New Order 
Period (from late 1970s onwards) witnessed efforts to undermine the ethnic identities of 
traditional adat communities with a view to promote the integration of the nation and 
modernise the state. This has been implemented through policies and programmes, e.g., 
significant changes in property rights in land and other natural resources. Even though the 4 
 
 
state did not formally own all of the free land, the notion of state controlled land was 
highlighted during this period. State resumed exclusive authority over any territories 
classified as the forest area including all aspects of human activities within it. These 
changes came as a threat to the traditional adat communities, who lived on land and 
natural resources for generations and maintained their autonomous culture, including 
aspects of language, belief, production patterns, law and social institutions. 
Trust and social capital within a close-knit ethnic group, e.g., adat communities, 
may give rise to feelings of loyalty and norms of solidarity to protect their traditional 
identity/livelihood, especially in response to a common perception of threat (e.g., that 
arising from Suharto’s attempt for national integration). Inclusion of social and religious 
norms could thus help reconciling conflicting preferences for public goods within a 
traditional community. We particularly distinguish between social (health and education) 
and physical (utility, transport, communications) public infrastructural goods. While 
investment in social infrastructural goods like health and education can directly improve 
skills and productivity of community people, thus facilitating production/exchange in the 
community, investment in physical infrastructure like transport and communications 
improve trade with outside communities only, thus threatening the basis of adat 
livelihoods, traditionally linked to land and natural resources. Accordingly, one could 
argue that traditional adat communities could rationally encourage investment in social 
infrastructure at the cost of that in public physical infrastructural goods (in an attempt to 
preserve their traditional identity). This is our central hypothesis. 
It is now well-established that access to public infrastructure is central to 
economic growth. Neglect in the provision of public capital and infrastructure could 5 
 
 
adversely affect the productivity of private capital (e.g., see Reinikka and Svensson, 
2004). In addition, good governments that invest in essential public goods and services 
realise high rates of return (e.g., see Easterly, 2001). Analysis in this paper highlights one 
possible mechanism through which culture can adversely affect economic development 
via investment in basic infrastructural goods. Using three rounds of Indonesian Family 
Life Survey (IFLS) data, we classify traditional communities as those strongly adhering 
to adat and Islam, which in turn allows us to examine the role of culture on the provision 
of local public infrastructure (even after controlling for all possible factors) among 
communities drawn from thirteen major provinces in Indonesia.  
Considering the public goods literature for Indonesia, Beard (2007) examines the 
effects of various household characteristics on household contribution to community 
development, while Bandeira and Levy (2007) focus on the role of democratic decision 
making on the provision of a number of public goods in Indonesia. Both these studies 
however use single cross-section IFLS data-set: Beard (2007) used third round of IFLS 
data while Banderia and Levy’s (2007) analysis is based on second round IFLS 1997.
1 
We use three rounds of IFLS data to construct a three-period (1993, 1997 and 2000) 
community-level panel data-set. Our analysis focuses on a community’s access to public 
transport, cemented road, piped water, public telephone office, post office, banks and 
markets (see further discussion in section 2) that could directly reduce community 
disadvantages related to location and distance.
2 We also consider community’s access to 
                                                 
1 There are other attempts to understand the politically economy of public goods provision in Indonesia 
(e.g., see Olken, 2007), which is based on author’s own survey data. 
2 Our analysis however excludes access to basic health and education services as the provision of these 





public schools (elementary, junior high and senior high) and health care (puskesmas and 
Posyandu) facilities. In addition to indices of religious and social norms, we also control 
for other conventional factors including public action and group efforts, nature of local 
governance as well as the characteristics of the community leader. 
An analysis of our sample data highlights a significant heterogeneity in the 
provision of public infrastructure among sample communities. Even after controlling for 
all other possible factors, we find that culture plays a significant role: traditional 
communities strongly adhering to adat and Islamic values/practices (as opposed to 
modern communities with weaker adherence to traditional adat and Islamic 
values/practices) tend to have comparable/better access to social infrastructure (schools 
and health facilities), but lower access to some physical infrastructural goods like 
motorized transport, cemented roads, telephone office and post office, thus lending some 
support to our central hypothesis.  
The analysis is developed as follows. Section 2 describes the data and research 
setting while section 3 analyses the results. The final section concludes. 
 
 
2. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The analysis has been based on the community-level data obtained from 1993, 1997 and 
2000 Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) from 314 rural and urban communities 
drawn from 13 provinces including Jakarta, Bali, Java (central, east and south), Sumatra 
(north, west and south), Lampung, Wntenara and south Kalimantan. This is a particularly 
rich data-set that provides community-level information on a whole range of 7 
 
 
demographic characteristics, public utilities, infrastructure and transport, health and 
education facilities, citizen’s participation in planning and implementation of local 
development projects. In addition, 1997 IFLS data set provides information on a 
community’s adherence to adat and common law as well as nature of community 
governance (consensus building, voting, or oligarchy). Following Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2006), we argue that social and religious norms tend to be persistent and 
change only slowly, even when they are no longer efficient. Accordingly, we link 1997 
adat and community governance information to 1993, 1997 and 2000 IFLS community-
level data on availability of public infrastructure and community development. Also 
reverse causality (from infrastructure to cultural norms) is ruled out here as cultural 
norms are generally inherited at birth and practised over generations. Finally, exit from a 
community, especially traditional community, is extremely rare. Communities adhere to 
various punitive mechanisms to prevent some members exit to take advantage of external 
economic opportunities. 
Starting in the 1970s and until early 1990s, the government of Indonesia had 
emphasized the importance of investment in infrastructural development. Several major 
projects were undertaken during this period, which have radically improved the 
availability of community-level infrastructure and public services in the country. Then 
the economic crisis of the 1990s had a major blow to the infrastructural investment; 
transport and communication output contracted by 36.44% and 15.13% respectively; road 
conditions deteriorated significantly due to the lack of maintenance fund. 
Decentralisation introduced in the new Millennium had a further adverse impact on 
infrastructural development though that is beyond the scope of the present study. Prior to 8 
 
 
2000, village governments were responsible for maintaining/providing utilities (water 
supply, electricity), local roads and transport (road/waterways), health posts and schools 
in the community. They also administered various income and food transfer programmes. 
These programmes were primarily financed by funds from the central government.   
  We focus on a number of basic infrastructural goods that could directly impact on 
sustainable livelihoods and provide opportunities for all, especially for the poor. First, the 
list of physical infrastructural goods includes cemented local roads (rather than national 
highways), motorized public transport (public bus/boat), public telephone office (PTO), 
post office (PO). Since economic backwardness and poverty in the country have often 
been caused by remoteness and isolation, local roads and different modes of motorized 
transport have a crucial role for economic development and poverty alleviation. 
Similarly, communication goods like PO and PTO could reduce the disadvantages related 
to location and distance. We include two more essential infrastructural services, namely, 
banks and markets that could facilitate formal exchange, thus assisting the process of 
economic development. This would also allow us to test if the traditional communities 
have any aversion to formal modes of exchange (Kranton 1996). Finally, we compare the 
cases of physical infrastructural goods with two important social infrastructural goods, 
namely, community’s access to public health and schooling facilities. 
Table 1 summarises the sample communities’ access to various local public 
infrastructure during the study period 1993-2000. In general there has been an 
improvement in the provision of a number of public goods over this period. The progress 
slowed down somewhat after the crisis, most notably for banks. The latter could be linked 
to the fact that the 1997 crisis started in the financial and banking sector though it quickly 9 
 
 
spilled over to the real sector. Despite the crisis, there has been impressive development 
in transport and communications in general.  
  Significant inter-community dispersion in our sample is pronounced. Inpres Deas 
Tertingadl (IDT) was the primary antipoverty programme in the country and was targeted 
to the poorest communities. Without any loss of generality, we use this information to 
classify sample communities as ‘underdeveloped’ if the community was selected for the 
implementation of IDT programmes; the rest of the communities are labelled 
‘developed’. Table 2 summarises mean differences in the provision of a range of basic 
infrastructural goods between under-developed and developed communities in our pooled 
sample. Despite significant infrastructural improvement in the 1970s and 1980s, access to 
motorized transport, cemented road, telephone office, post office, is significantly lower in 
the under-developed communities in the 1990s.
3 However the difference is not 
statistically significant in case of access to government schools (elementary, junior and 
senior schools) and health facilities (government health centres, puskesmas and 
community health posts, posyandu), thus revealing traditional community’s preference 
for the latter .  
 
2.1. Social and religious norms  
Literally ‘adat community’ translates to ‘autonomous’ groups of indigenous people who 
are able to manage their lives without knowing western laws and established their own 
regulations and social control. Adat laws are formally mapped by Dutch legal scholars to 
provide the basis for the legal system to rule over the indigenous Indonesians, with few 
                                                 
3 Note that the electricity coverage is very high (above 90%) in both developed and under-developed 




exceptions to protect Dutch commercial interests involving transactions between 
Indonesians and Europeans. Accordingly the Dutch Colonial rule recognised village 
government as lawful entities and encouraged to self-rule. In modern Indonesia, however, 
the autonomy of the adat communities has not always been officially recognised, 
especially during Suharto’s New Order Period (1978 onwards).  
The 1998 reform that led to the fall of Suharto’s regime was however an 
important moment when the autonomy of adat communities was officially recognised. 
The latter found an expression in the formation of AMAN which is an alliance for the 
Indonesian indigenous people. AMAN defined adat community to be a community living 
together based on their origins intergenerationally in adat land, who have sovereignty 
over the land and the natural resources, their socio-cultural life being regulated by adat 
law and adat institutions, which manage sustainability of community lives.  
Religious norms too could play an important role in community development. In 
the Indonesian case there remains a historical division between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
Islamic values/practices. Nahdlatur Ulama (NU) has been the world’s largest Muslim 
organisation founded by Javanese Muslim scholars in 1926. It had soon distinguished 
itself as a force for the promotion of ‘traditional’ Sunni Islamic values/though/practices 
across the regions, distinguishing them from ‘Muslim modernists’, who sought to reform 
Indonesia. NU has, however, significant contribution to promote various social 
infrastructure including religious education, women’s empowerment, family planning and 
reproductive health across the country.  
2.1.1. Community classification 
Our analysis classifies communities according to a community’s adherence to (a) social 11 
 
 
norms and (b) religious norms. Depending on the degree of adherence to adat laws, IFLS 
data classifies a community into 4 categories: (i) traditional laws are almost never broken; 
(ii) sometimes traditional laws are broken; (iii) traditional laws are frequently broken and 
(iv) only a few people understand traditional laws. We use this information to classify a 
community as ‘adat’ community (a binary variable labelled ADAT) if adat laws are 
almost never broken; the variable takes a value zero otherwise. Second, IFLS data also 
provides information on the main religion practised in a community; thus a community is 
classified to be an Islamic community (a second binary variable labelled ISLAM) if Islam 
is the main religion. Given that Indonesia is an Islamic country, it is also important for us 
to identify the ‘traditional Islamic communities’ from the rest. In the absence of any 
direct information in this respect, we use the religion information ISLAM in conjunction 
with the ADAT information. This is done by creating a composite index of ISLAM and 
ADAT using principal component method and labelled as PCNORM. About 28% of all 
communities strongly adhere to adat while as high as 86% of these adat communities had 
Islam as the main religion. We thus define Islamic adat communities as ‘traditional 
Islamic’ communities to distinguish them from others labelled as ‘modern Islamic’ 
communities. In the absence of any existing empirical evidence in this respect, the effect 
of social and religious norms on public infrastructure remains a matter of empirical 
scrutiny that we explore in the paper.  
2.1.2. Sample characteristics 
Demographic dimensions of adat communities in our sample are worth noting (Table 2). 12 
 
 
In general, adat communities tend to be strongly ethnically linked and predominantly 
rural. Often these communities are dominated by a single large ethnic population group 
while the average population size is significantly smaller than the non-adat communities. 
Also the proportion of university educated population tends to be much less in adat 
communities though the difference is significant only at about 10% level. Role of 
education could be important in influencing culture, as education can reduce the role of 
inherited cultural aspects in the formation of priors. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) 
have shown the dependence of trust (and thus prior belief) on cultural variables weakens 
for more educated people. It clearly follows from Table 2 that compared to non-
traditional communities, traditional communities have significantly lower access to 
selected physical infrastructural goods; similar differences are mirrored in the comparison 
of developed and under-developed communities in our sample. The case of social 
infrastructure is however different for both cases: number of government schools is 
significantly higher in traditional communities while number of health facilities is not 
statistically different between traditional and modern communities. Similar result holds 
when we consider share of government schools (as proportion of total schools) and health 
facilities (as proportion of total health facilities). Our analysis in the rest of the paper 
investigates if this preliminary result holds, even after controlling for all other possible 
covariates. 
There is also significant variation in average community characteristics across the 
provinces. Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the selected community 
characteristics across the sample provinces. In general, provinces with higher average 
population per community, higher proportion of university educated population and lower 13 
 
 
proportion of strongly adat communities tend to have better provision of all types of 
public infrastructural goods under consideration; these better off provinces also tend to 
have relatively lower proportion of under-developed communities. For example, the 
average community size is much bigger in Jakarta while influence of adat laws is rather 
negligible in the province; Jakarta is also the province with the lowest proportion of 
underdeveloped communities in the country, as against those in Bali or Wntenara, for 
example. 
 
2.2. Other Possible Covariates 
In addition to social and religious norms, we identify three sets of possible factors 
influencing a community’s access to public infrastructure. Choice of these factors has 
been guided by the existing literature. These are (a) collective action and its 
sustainability, (b) nature of local governance and (c) characteristics of the community 
leader. 
2.2.1. Collective action 
We consider population size of the community as an index of group effort (or collective 
action). It is also important to consider the factors that could enhance the long-term 
sustainability of public action in a community. To this end, we include the proportion of 
university educated population since a higher proportion of university educated 
population could arguably contribute to the sustainability of group efforts for essential 
community causes. In order to check the robustness of our results we also control for the 
average proportion of household members with at least junior high schooling and average 14 
 
 
community level mean monthly expenditure (both food and non-food taken together) in 
alternative specifications (see further discussion in section 3.2). 
2.2.2. Nature of local governance  
Prior to decentralisation of the new Millennium, local governments were responsible for 
maintaining/providing utilities, local transport, health posts and schools in the 
community, primarily with funds from the central government. Decision making 
regarding the allocation of funds could be classified into two broad categories: (a) 
majority decision making through consensus building or voting and (b) elite 
dominance/oligarchy whereby local religious/legal elite or officers in local government 
institutions influenced the decision-making process.
4 The governance mechanism varied 
across the regions though as high as 73% of the communities followed some kind of 
majority rule. If however we classify the majority rule into voting and consensus building 
(e.g., through meeting with community citizens), we find that consensus building (as 
against voting) is a more common mode of decision making, especially in traditional 
communities in the sample.  
2.2.3. Profile of the community leader 
The extent of collective action in a community would also depend on the actions of the 
community leader. IFLS data allows us to identify the characteristics of the community 
leader. Community leaders are typically elected by popular votes and upon election they 
become members of the Indonesian Civil Service.  
                                                 
4 This is derived from a response from the community head: decision making by voting, all residents 
(which we label as consensus building), local elites, local institutions and others. Thus decision making by 
local elites, local institutions and others are labelled as decision making by oligarchy.   15 
 
 
Given that the gender of the leader is endogenous to the choice of programme, our 
analysis focuses on other relevant characteristics of the leader. In particular, we consider 
education (i.e., if the leader has college education or more COLLEGE) and also the years 
in position of the community leader (if the tenure is 10 years or more).
5 As high as 97% 
community leaders is male in our sample. While only about 28% leaders have college or 
higher education; about 38% of community leaders have been in tenure for 10 years or 
more. We shall examine the possible role of these characteristics on the provision of 
public infrastructure in sample communities. 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Provision of public infrastructure in a community is a reflection of community 
organisation and preferences, which in turn depend on a number of community 
characteristics. The model specification is discussed in section 3.1 while results are 
analysed in sections 3.2 and 3.3; estimates of access to individual infrastructural goods 




3.1. Model specification 
We use three rounds of IFLS panel data to determine a community’s access to a range of 
public infrastructural goods and utility services. The list of dependent variables includes 
(a) binary variables indicating a community’s access to pucca (cemented) road (PROAD), 
                                                 
5 We also considered age of the head, but did not include it as it is closely correlated to the tenure in office. 16 
 
 
motorized public transport (TRANS), public telephone office (PTO) and post office (PO), 
market (MARKET) and bank (BANK). (b) In addition, we consider some indices of 
social infrastructure, namely, number (GOVSCH_N, GOVHLTH_N) as well as share of 
public schools (PGOVSCH) and public health facilities (PHLTHF) in the community. (c) 
We also construct a composite index of access to various public infrastructure listed in (a) 
above, namely, PCDEV, using principal component method. (d) Finally, we generate an 
index of under-development (a binary variable) as follows. If a community has been 
selected for the ongoing IDT programme during the sample period, we define it to be an 
underdeveloped community (UNDEV) and examine the probability of the community to 
be under-developed. Note however that there is a crucial difference between (a), (d) on 
the one hand and (b), (c) on the other: while indicators of public goods and 
underdevelopment listed in (a) and (d) are all binary in nature those in (b) and (c) are 
continuous variables. Accordingly, we use binary probit models for (a) and (d), while we 
use continuous regression models for estimating (b) and (c). In each case, we apply panel 
data models as explained below. 
In general, we estimate an equation of the following type to determine any 
dependent variable Yit of our choice (as laid out in infrastructural indicators (a)-(d) 
above) in the i-th community at t-th time:  
Yit =’Xit + i+uit     (1) 
where i refers to the i-th community, i = 1,2,…..,314 and t to the time dimension of the 
data, t = 1993, 1997 and 2000. i is the unobserved community-level fixed-effects (that 
does not change over time) whereas uit is the idiosyncratic error (assumed to be 
distributed with zero mean and unit variance) that varies across community (i) and also 17 
 
 
over time (t). In other words, i accounts for the unobserved time-invariant community-
level factors, e.g., government funding, external influences or administrator’s 
preferences, affecting the provision of the particular public infrastructure in question.  
Xit is the set of explanatory variables reflecting four sets of factors: (i) group size 
and its sustainability; (ii) characteristics of the community leader; (iii) measures of 
community governance; (iv) indices of social and religious norms. As indicator of group 
effort, we include the community size measured by the log of community population 
(LVPOP). Sustainability of group effort over time is accounted for by the proportion of 
university educated population (PUED). We also include a binary variable POP11 
indicating whether the population of the largest ethnic group is greater than or equal to 
90%; this is used as an index of ethnic diversity, as ethnic diversity is an important 
determinant of public goods provision.
6 Second, we include some characteristics of the 
community leader, namely, education (if has college education or more, COLLEGE) and 
also if the head is in position for ten years or more (TENURE10). We do not include age 
of the community leader as it seems to be closely correlated with tenure in office. Third, 
we include two indices of local governance: if the community adheres to decision making 
by consensus building (DMMEET) and that by voting (DMVOTE); the reference 
category here is oligarchic decision making. Finally, we have two binary variables 
indicating a community’s strong adherence to traditional adat laws (ADAT), and if Islam 
is the main religion (ISLAM). We generate a composite index of ADAT and ISLAM 
(called PCNORM) using principal component analysis. Since one is born into a given 
culture and cannot choose his/her parents’ religion and cultural beliefs, the question of 
                                                 
6 We also experimented with a measure of ethnic heterogeneity 1-pi
2 where pi is the population proportion 
of different ethnic groups in the population. However this index was never significant in any specification. 18 
 
 
reverse causality (from public goods to cultural norms) does not apply here. Finally we 
include a dummy for the post-crisis year 2000 (which also marks the end of Suharto 
regime and a change towards more decentralised community governance); a second 
dummy is included to indicate whether it is a rural community as rural communities are 
more likely to be underdeveloped as well as more traditional (see Table 2). A third 
dummy indicates a community’s nearness to sea. Table 4 shows the means and standard 
deviations of all the regression variables used in our analysis.  
For each dependent variable of our choice, we try three specifications: (1) we start 
with conventional covariates (i) and (ii); (2) we augment specification (1) by covariates 
(iii); (3) is the complete specification, where we augment (2) by  the cultural covariates 
(iv), directly linked to our central hypothesis. 
Probit model does not lend itself well to the fixed effects treatment. Hence, for 
cases in (a) and (d), we first determine logit fixed effects models.
7 The latter allows for 
the possibility that some xis could be correlated with fixed effects is. In an attempt to 
check the robustness of fixed effects estimates, we also compare the fixed effects 
estimates with more general random effects estimates (which also allow us to include the 
time invariant factors). The underlying assumptions for the random effects are that Xit’s 
are purely exogenous and i’s are uncorrelated with Xits so the total estimation error is vit 
= (i + uit). Thus the variance of vit = 1+ 
2
 where  
2
 is the variance of i; also, 
covariance of (vit, vis ) =  so that  
2
 =  /(1-  ). We obtain the consistent estimates of all 
the parameters including  .  
                                                 
7 Note however that the social norms and governance variables are time-invariant in our 





For each of the selected public infrastructure, it is therefore important for us to 
choose between fixed and random effects models. We use Hausman test for estimating 
continuous dependent variables as in (b) and (c), while a variant of the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test when the dependent variable is binary in nature (i.e., cases (a) and 
(d)). The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that i is uncorrelated; in other words, 
acceptance of the null implies acceptance of random effects. The LM test boils down to a 
test of significance of  . Rejection of the null hypothesis that  =0 leads to an acceptance 
of the alternative hypothesis in favour of the random effects estimates (see Tables 5-8). In 
each case, we also estimate the corresponding pooled OLS estimates as the baseline 
model (see Appendix Tables A1-A3).  
3.2. Estimates of individual infrastructural goods 
Given that the parameter   is statistically significant, we consider the random effects 
estimates to be appropriate for our sample. A further advantage of these random effects 
estimates is that we can now directly control for the time-invariant factors (e.g., local 
decision making – voting and consensus building and also Adat and Islam). Estimates of 
access to physical infrastructure for the complete specification (3) are summarised in 
Table 5; Table 6 shows the corresponding estimates for access to social infrastructural 
goods. Estimates for the intermediate specifications (1) and (2) are shown Appendix 
Tables A4 and A5. Estimates are quite robust and do not change with the change of the 
specifications. Our discussion in the rest of the paper is couched in terms of the complete 
specification (3). 20 
 
 
  The size of the community population turns out to be a strong predictor for access 
to any public good/services considered here. There is confirmation that larger 
communities tend to have more access to different public infrastructure, thus highlighting 
the importance of group size and public action for public goods provision. Quality and 
sustainability of public action is important too, especially in the provision of public 
infrastructural goods requiring huge investment. In particular, communities with higher 
proportion of university educated population are more likely to get pucca road, telephone 
office. Some leadership characteristics could also influence a traditional community’s 
aversion to certain public goods. In particular, ceteris paribus, a community’s probability 
of having a public telephone office is higher if the community leader has college or 
higher education, while the community leader being in position for ten years or more has 
a significant positive effect on the likelihood of having access to pucca road. Other things 
being equal, there is direct evidence of the significant role of culture on the provision of 
local infrastructure in our sample, thus supporting our central hypothesis. Traditional 
Islamic adat communities (as reflected in the significance of PCNORM) are significantly 
less likely to have access to motorized public transport, pucca road, post office, telephone 
office and markets. Similar results hold even when we include individual adat and Islam 
variables.  
In contrast, estimates shown in Table 6 highlight the contrasting role of 
traditionalism on access to social infrastructure. Here we present two sets of estimates: 
share of public school and health facilities and also actual number of public school and 
health facilities in the community. While traditional communities are more likely to have 
greater share of public schools and public health facilities in our sample, there is no 21 
 
 
evidence that traditional communities are significantly different from others when we 
consider number of public schools and health facilities as such. These results hold even 
after accounting for all other possible covariates. 
We also do some robustness checks. First we replace proportion of university 
educated by the proportion of family members with at least junior high schooling; results 
remain unchanged. We have also tried to incorporate average per capita monthly 
household expenditure in the community as an indicator of prosperity and the results 
remain unchanged. Taken together, one can argue that, holding other factors unchanged, 
traditional Islamic adat communities in Indonesia tend to prefer investment in social 
rather than physical infrastructure, as investment in social (as opposed to physical) 
infrastructure directly benefits its people and community.  
 
3.3. Estimates of Community Development 
In this section, we consider the factors determining the probability of a community being 
underdeveloped, using the same set of explanatory variables as in section 3.2. We first 
consider a composite index of access to various physical infrastructural goods obtained 
by using the principal component analysis of a community’s access to bus, road, post 
office, public telephone office, bank and market. Given that it is a continuous variable, 
we obtain both fixed and random effects estimates. Since the Hausman statistic indicates 
that the random effects estimates should be preferred, our discussion focuses on the 
random effects estimates of composite public goods (see Table 7). These estimates 
suggest that traditional (Islamic and Adat) communities suffer from a lack of access to 
public physical infrastructure provision of composite public goods in our sample.  22 
 
 
Finally, we determine an index of under-development, which is a binary variable 
indicating whether a community has been selected for the on-going IDT programme in 
the relevant year. If a community has been selected for IDT, it is regarded as an 
underdeveloped community – we use this information to construct a binary variable of 
under-development. Table 8 shows both the logit fixed effects and probit random effects  
estimates of UNDEV for all sample communities. Given that   is significant, as before 
we choose the random effects estimates. Clearly these random effects estimates highlight 
that communities with strong adherence to adat and Islam are more likely to be 
underdeveloped. Other things being equal, we argue that this result has a cultural 
interpretation. In particular, traditional Islamic communities prefer to invest more in 
social infrastructure (e.g., health and education), but less on physical infrastructure that 
connects them with the outside world; the latter helps them maintain their indigenous way 
of life away from modern Muslim modernists and also by relying more on informal 
parochial networks within their community.  
There is thus consistent evidence from our analysis that even after accounting for 
other factors, cultural considerations do exert a significant impact on a community’s 
access to local social and physical infrastructure in our sample. One possible 
interpretation would be that religion and ethnicity could affect trust, which in turn may 
affect optimal investment in social capital, especially as a response to the perception of a 
common threat, e.g., from Muslim modernists who seek to reform Indonesia. The latter in 
turn may give rise to feelings of duty, respect and loyalty or as norms of solidarity and 
service among traditional adat communities to protect their indigenous way of life; the 
result could be significant investment in social infrastructure, but lower provision of 23 
 
 
physical infrastructure including transport and communications. Analysis using three 




The present paper goes beyond the existing literature to argue that local culture, i.e., 
religious and social norms could explain a part of the variation in the provision of public 
goods and infrastructure across communities within a country. Using three rounds of 
Indonesian family life survey data and controlling for all possible covariates, we find that 
traditional Islamic communities tend to have lower provision of physical infrastructural 
goods like pucca road, motorized transport, post office, public telephone office, while 
they are not significantly different from others with respect to social infrastructural goods 
like health and education. While social infrastructural goods could contribute to exchange 
within/outside the community, investment in physical infrastructural goods could only 
improve exchange outside the community. One could thus argue that a lower provision of 
physical infrastructural goods in traditional communities could highlight their attempt to 
preserve their indigenous way of life, especially in response to the perception of a 
common threat from Muslim modernists in Indonesia’s pluralistic society. The latter 
clearly stands in the way of reducing economic backwardness and poverty which have 
often been caused by the remoteness and isolation in the country. 
Our results also highlight the role of education and nature of community 
governance on the provision of physical infrastructural goods in the region. In particular, 
proportion of university educated population and community decision making through 24 
 
 
consensus building, e.g., by community meetings (rather than voting) tend to have a 
significantly favourable effect on the probability of a community being developed. In 
other words, higher levels of education and mass community participation in decision 
making could gradually pave the way for modern development. It is thus interesting to 
see how the spread of education in a traditional community could gradually influence 
culture (e.g., Gusio, Sapienza and Zingales) and could thereby pave the way for modern 
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